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SURVIVING THE OCCUPATION:
A PERSONAL JOURNEY THROUGH EAST TIMOR

by

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Introduction

'And what is a teacher?' enquired the guard at the Indonesian checkpoint on the East Timor border as we showed our passports. 'Look, a teacher does this' - my son wrote as though on an imaginary blackboard. 'Ah yes, we know what you do - you are an artist and you have come to East Timor

to teach your son sketching!' That suited me just fine - a fictive identity courtesy of the Indonesians. What more could one want? They had even written my name wrongly in their dusty ledger, mistaking my middle name for my surname. So, welcome Peter Ramsay, artist, to the land of violence and make believe.

Timtim (Timor Timur), Jakarta's '27th Province', is now in its twenty-second year of Indonesian occupation. A former Portuguese colony (the most distant and neglected of all Lisbon's overseas possessions), it was invaded on 7 December 1975 by Indonesia to prevent its independence under the left-leaning Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin). It has since suffered one of the heaviest population losses in post-war history with nearly a third of the original - pre-1975 - inhabitants - 200,000 out of 700,000 people - being killed by war, famine, disease and neglect.(1) This would be the equivalent of Scotland losing its entire population north of Stirling, a form of genocidal 'Highland Clearance' carried out by an army of 'Butcher' Cumberlands. In present-day Indonesia, the Duke's spiritual descendants are richly rewarded: every Indonesian soldier serving in East Timor draws double pay and opportunities for personal advancement abound, especially for the officers. President Suharto's son-in-law, Major-General Prabowo Subianto,

the youngest general in the Indonesian army and commander of the élite Special Forces (Kopassus), is just one whose career has been assisted by his East Timor experience. Units of his much feared regiment - known locally as the Rajawali (eagle) and Nanggala (magical ploughshare weapon) companies - can be seen everywhere. Armed with Heckler and Koch automatic weapons - courtesy of British Aerospace (BAe) which purchased the German company three years ago(2) - they patrol in civilian dress in unmarked Toyota landcruisers with smoked-glass windows.

The hours of darkness are their favourite time as I discovered nearly to my cost. At eight o'clock on a moonless night, I was travelling back with my sixteen-year old son and a local priest from the extreme eastern point of the island, a famous beauty spot. Noticing lights to the left of our vehicle, I turned to the priest to ask about their provenance. No sooner had the reply 'Kopassus' (special forces) left his mouth, than a figure dressed entirely in black (jump-suit zipped up the front with the peaked cap of the Rajawali unit shading his moustached face) loomed out of the darkness, powerful halogen torch in hand. Up in front, just visible behind a large palm tree, was another Kopassus soldier, covering our pick-up truck with his automatic rifle. 'What are you doing out on the road so late Father?' The priest had already warned us that too tardy a return might

raise suspicions that we had been in contact with the Falintil (Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste/ Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor) guerrillas. 'Just returning from a swim, Pak (literally 'father' - the honorific title given to all Indonesian occupying forces, known colloquially and - with disdain by locals - as the 'Bapak(s)')'. Now we had some explaining to do for these were only recently deployed Kopassus troops, just arrived from their base at Batujajar in West Java, tense and trigger-happy in an all too hostile land. The priest, however, was a well-known figure and we had a perfect alibi since we were expected in the next village to collect a sick parishioner for treatment at the mission centre. Even then nothing was left to chance: our jump-suited friend followed us into the village, and, with his commanding officer present (a young engineer captain), proceeded to monitor our conversation with the Timorese village head. During this exchange, he let slip some interesting facts: not only had he served in East Timor before during the infamous 'Operation Security' (Operasi Keamanan) in 1982, when almost the entire able-bodied male Timorese population between the ages of 15 and 50 had been forced to act as 'beaters' crossing the island in long lines from west to east to flush out the Falintil/Fretilin fighters (an operation which had caused many deaths),(3) but he had also just received training in Australia having

participated in the 'Kangaroo 95' (June-July 1995) joint exercises with the Australian army and commando units of the Australian Special Boat Squadron (SBS). There could be no more vivid illustration of the way in which Western military establishments, in particular the British, Australians and Americans, are continuing to provide direct assistance to the Indonesian armed forces in their illegal occupation of East Timor.

While our conversation ended with handshakes all round, it is quite different for Timorese who fall into Kopassus clutches. Mere suspicion of involvement with the guerrillas or the civilian clandestine resistance can mean a death sentence. In the same area where I met the jump-suited commando, I received news that two Timorese suspects had been tied to a post and starved to death in an undisclosed location near the south coast. Now that Kopassus techniques of 'disappearing' suspects are becoming ever more sophisticated (many are buried in shallow graves) right under their camps, it is increasingly hard for agencies like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to trace victims. At the same time, Kopassus interrogation methods are often designed to leave few marks on the bodies of their prisoners: black plastic bags drawn tight over the head to induce temporary suffocation (with water sometimes being poured over the outside to give the impression of drowning) is a

favourite. Even Timorese who work for the Indonesian administration are tortured in this fashion: a sub-district head (camat) near Lospalos had been taken from his house at night on three separate occasions to undergo the black bag treatment. This experience had shaken him so badly that he had confided to our friend, the local priest, that another torture session would be beyond endurance. Flight to the provincial capital, Dili, which the priest offered to facilitate, seemed the only way to escape further persecution. At least there, arrest and imprisonment would not necessarily spell death at the hands of the Kopassus torturers.

Indonesian Force Deployment: Rival Command Structures and Security Levels

What was most depressing for me in East Timor was to discover the ubiquitousness, impunity and multi-layered nature of the Indonesian military presence. Known to local Timorese as the 'green snakes', Indonesian soldiers are everywhere - patrolling in full battle-dress in broad daylight, their green camouflage uniforms blending uneasily into the lush vegetation of the late rainy season countryside. In the coffee growing town of Ermera (pop. 40,000+), some 35 kilometres to the northwest of Dili, near where the Falintil commander, Konis Santana, was said to be conducting operations, no fewer than five new infantry

battalions, each with around 700 men, had recently been deployed, at least three of them from Sulawesi (Celebes) - two of them crack units attached to the Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad) - and the others from East and Central Java.(4) Indeed, so intense was the security presence at the time of my visit that locals told me that they dared not go too far into their coffee gardens for fear that they might be suspected of having contacts with the armed resistance. Given the fact that these regular Indonesian Army 'territorial' troops are rotated every eight months, it is extremely difficult for the local Timorese to establish good working relations with them. No sooner have contacts and understandings been reached than new battalions come in and the process has to begin all over again. The problems caused by the large numbers of troops on the ground - official Indonesian sources admit to over 15,000, but there may be over double that number(5) - and the bewildering number of different levels of military and para-military presence, compounds the problems on the ground. In Ermera, for example - along with other sensitive areas like Baucau, Viqueque, Lautem and Lospalos where the armed resistance is especially active - there are at least five levels of security, each answerable to their own separate command structures.

Starting at the village level, there are first the local - often Timorese - Koramil (Kommando Rayon Militer/ sub-district military command) troops, who act as the provincial garrison force. These are assisted by Hansip/Wanra (Pertahanan Sipil) (also known as Ratih (Rakyat Terlatih/Trained People's Force) or civil defense units, which are nearly all locally recruited, and the special Timorese battalions (744 and 745).(6) Alongside them are the police and village 'guidance' officials, usually NCOs seconded from the Indonesian police and army - the so-called Binpolda and Babinsa - who are there to 'assist' (in fact, 'direct') the local village heads (kepala desa) in security matters, but who often wield more power than they. In every village, there also intelligence agents. Often these are soldiers disguised as merchants who sell things from house to house to enable them to listen in to people's conversations and uncover political activity, which is then reported back to the police and the military.(7)

In 1995, a new surveillance initiative was launched by Major-General Prabowo (then Deputy Commander (post-December 1995, Commander) of Kopassus). This was the Garda Paksi (Upholders of Integration (Penegak Integrasi) (Youth) Guard), which is recruited locally from Timorese youth. Resistance sources in Lisbon refer to them as 'Timorese collaborators, generally unemployed, with a low-level of educational achievement',

some of whom hail from pro-integration Apodeti (Associacão Popular Democrática Timorense/Timorese Popular Democratic Association) families.(8) The Garda are principally targetted at the East Timorese Clandestine Front, the civilian arm of the resistance, which has carried off some striking propaganda coups against the Suharto regime, most notably the November 1994 APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum) sit-in at the US Embassy in Jakarta. They are given basic military training at the Indonesian army base in Aileu some 30 kms to the south of Dili, and are then sent for further training under Kopassus auspices in Java.

Thought initially to number some 6,000 (500 of whom have been assigned to keep tabs on East Timorese students in Java and Bali) and led by José Catarino de Melo, a well-known East Timorese intelligence agent, and a certain Martinho, a former East Timorese sub-district head (camat) of Ossu near Viqueque(9), their particular task has been to infiltrate the Clandestine Front, whose previous secretary-general, Pedro Nunes (aka Sabalae) and assistant, Remigio Levi da Costa Tilman, were arrested in June 1995 and tortured to death by Kopassus interrogators.(10) One incident during my visit to East Timor in April 1997 provided a vivid illustration of the tensions wrought by the activities of these Garda Paksi

in present-day East Timor. This was the ambush by the Falintil resistance of the local Garda Paksi head near Viqueque on 7 April 1997. This man, Eugenio Soares, who was shot along with five of his colleagues (four of them Hansip members), had apparently made himself deeply unpopular on account of the numerous arrests and torture of suspects which had taken place in the Uatolari district in February and March 1997, when over 100 had been seized (some dragged out from the sanctuary of the local priest's house and church).(11)

While the Garda Paksi, Hansip/Ratih, Koramil, and local Timorese battalion units, form the first level of security in East Timor, the second is provided by the Indonesian police, a large number of whom (some estimates speak of 2000+, or about a quarter of the total deployed in Timor) are drawn from the Brimob (Brigade Mobil or Mobile Brigade; also sometimes known as Perintis), the paramilitary force originally established by the Dutch in the late colonial period (1609-1942) to deal with armed insurrections. Since 1962, this unit, along with all the other police units, have been formally militarized and placed under the control of the Indonesian armed forces (ABRI/Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia).(12) In fact, in East Timor, the police chief ranks second to the regional (Korem/Komando Resort Militer) military commander in terms of local

security responsibilities, giving the lie to arguments by some Western Governments (e.g. the British) that the Indonesian police force are separate from the Indonesian military.(13) Relations between the police and the army are not always easy, especially in East Timor, the regular soldiers looking down on the police as the least prestigious and most corrupt branch of the armed forces, feelings which are shared by the vast majority of Timorese, who refer to them as 'monkeys'.(14) So intense are the rivalries between the army regulars and the police in Timor that violent incidents and tit-for-tat shootings are not unknown. It was even suggested that the ambush which killed 21 policemen outside Baucau on 30 May 1997 following the General Election might have been the work of the army since their truck was flagged down by a soldier in Indonesian battledress.(15) The only positive aspect of the police presence is that their interrogation methods are, on the whole, less drastic than those employed by the army regulars and the special forces (Kopassus) (see below), although even here physical violence against suspects is considered the norm.(16)

The third level of security is provided by the regular ABRI infantry battalions and support units, sometimes referred to confusingly as 'territorial' troops. As we have seen, these units are regularly rotated

through short (8-12 month) postings, perhaps to prevent them building up too close a rapport with the local people or the Falintil guerrillas, as happened in the 1976-77 period and again in 1983, when individual battalion commanders entered into a series of local ceasefire arrangements with the East Timorese resistance often to further their own commercial interests.(17) The system of regular rotation ensures that nearly all ABRI infantry battalions have some fighting experience in East Timor, an experience which, until recently, not only guaranteed better rates of pay for ordinary soldiers, but also faster rates of promotion for officers. Since the 12 November 1991 Santa Cruz Massacre, however, this last prospect has become less assured. Two generals lost their commands at that time, and other senior officers have subsequently found their careers blighted rather than advanced by East Timor service.(18)

The fourth level of security is assured by the Special Forces (Kopassus). Numbering some 4000 in all (a figure which is set to rise under Major-General Prabowo's current command), a large number - perhaps as many as a quarter of the entire regiment - are regularly deployed in East Timor. Here they serve their own independent command structure, one which is not subject to the local district (Kodim/Komando Distrik Militer) commanders, but answerable directly to their regimental headquarters

in West Java. Although overall command responsibility is assumed by Major-General Prabowo, who has himself served five tours of duty in East Timor, most recently as operational commander at Ossu near Viqueque in the central military district (1989-91), when both he and his troops earned a reputation for violence against the local population (19), direct operational authority has been vested in recent years (ie since the 12 November 1991 Santa Cruz Massacre) in the Korem commander in Dili, who has, since 1995, been a special forces officer with close links to Prabowo.(20) Kopassus also run the principle military intelligence operation in East Timor - the SGI (Satgas Intelijens/Intelligence Task Force) - which operates the notorious prison and torture/interrogation centre at Colmera, a suburb of Dili, where many Timorese political prisoners are held.(21)

The fifth, and most ubiquitous, level of security is provided by the numerous agents provocateurs and intelligence agents (nicknamed bufo [clowns] by the locals) who are to be found everywhere in East Timor. As Bishop Belo once put it, this is a society in which 'one half of the population is paid to spy on the other half'.(22) Unlike the other security operations, which cover certain clearly defined areas, the intelligence community spans the whole of society. Intelligence work is being carried

out at every level of security enforcement - the close connections between the Kopassus and the Garda Paksi have already been noted - although how effectively this information is used is quite another matter. Some personal experiences might be helpful here by way of illustration.

Spies, Agents Provocateurs and 'Clowns' (Bufo)

Already, on my journey through West Timor, Indonesian policemen in civilian clothes had boarded my bus between the market town of Kefamenanu and Atambua to find out the purpose of my voyage (questions which they had directed both at my son - who was sitting away from me at the back of the bus - as well as myself). The recent Muslim-Christian riots in the East Timorese enclave of Oecussi, which had been sparked by an insult to the local priest following a Muslim religious feast (Slametan) in March, and the subsequent disturbances in Kefamenanu itself, when the main market had been burnt down, may have heightened their concerns.(23) By the time we reached Atambua, where I changed buses for Dili in the mid-afternoon, they had already alighted, but other Indonesian security personnel in mufti seemed to be present on that last leg too. Certainly, our presence was reported to the intelligence services soon after our arrival in Dili later that night, because,

no sooner had we emerged from the Bishop's residence in Lecidere making for the Hotel Turismo then we heard a loud bang on the other side of the road: a white Toyota landcruiser, which had been circling the Bishop's house during our visit, had mounted the curb and was careering along the opposite pavement, the driver having temporarily lost control of the vehicle so intent was he on watching the curious sight of two foreigners with back-packs moving along the darkened Dili waterfront promenade.

Nor was that the only surprise in store for us. I never, for example, received a bill in my name at the Hotel Turismo itself (all receipts for payment being carefully made out to my sixteen-year-old son!), my registration form having been removed from the front desk soon after our arrival and handed on, I presumed, to the intelligence services. That this had indeed occurred was vividly brought home to me the second day after our arrival in Dili when two East Timorese 'students' - Ruy (18) and Carlito (23) - accosted us while walking along the same waterfront road. These supposed students of tourism (I never discovered if such a subject was even taught at the local university) immediately gave the game away when I asked them to guess my age. While Carlito hazarded a cautious 'late 30s', Ruy plumped for an unerringly accurate '49'. Just good

luck? Hardly! The vanished registration form floated momentarily before my eyes. They had been briefed! Yet, what they did with the information which they extracted from us always remained a mystery to me. While, they must have surmised that we were not ordinary tourists, no attempt was ever made to search or question us closely - even at the airport on our departure (which did not so much as scan our bags). Just laziness, or a reluctance on Ruy and Carlito's part to play the role assigned to them by their Indonesian intelligence mentors?

Sometimes, the approach adopted was more indirect and subtle. Elliptical conversations seemed to be the order of the day, especially with 'strangers' whom we met - seemingly by chance, 'in another part of the wood' as it were - while waiting at various bus stations and roadside halts. 'What is the highest mountain in East Timor', was the opening gambit of one rather well groomed young man sitting along the shabby shopfront of Baucau bus station, who gave his name as 'Philip' (and who certainly knew a thing or to about us since he asked me why I was contemplating another trip to Venilale, when I had never even told him about my original visit there). 'Ramelau! Yes, it must be Foho (Mt) Ramelau!' came my reply. 'I also know something else about it too!' I incautiously went on. 'And what is that?' asked Philip. 'A song! Yes, a song... ' 'Don't say that' cut

in Philip, 'It's dangerous!'. Then why did he ask me in the first place when he knew that any mention of Timor's highest mountain would inevitably bring to mind the banned East Timorese national anthem - 'Foho Ramelau'? Was it all an elaborate trap to lead me into compromising indiscretions?

A bold Fretilin handshake, in which the thumb is grasped and bent backwards, was the opening gambit of others. Yet whether one was dealing with a genuine Fretilin supporter or an intelligence agent was quite another matter. 'John of Gaunt! What do you know about John of Gaunt and his relations with Portugal?' was the question posed by another well turned out Timorese encountered at the same Baucau bus station. No ordinary bus station this! John of Gaunt? My interlocutor was half-remembering, so he said, the history he had been taught at the exclusive Portuguese high school in Dili, the Liceu Dr Francisco Veira Machado, in the 1960s and was just so delighted to meet a fellow historian. Could I tell him more about the marriage of John of Gaunt's daughter, Philippa, to King John I of Portugal (r. 1385-1433), and the making of the Anglo-Portuguese dynastic alliance in the late fourteenth century? 'Sorry, not my period!' I replied. Yet his questions intrigued me. What was he driving at? Was this just intellectual curiosity or something

deeper and more meaningful? Was he trying to tell me something in elaborately nuanced code? Something to do with England and Portugal, our oldest European ally, and the need for our support on the Timor issue? In the end, I never knew. The conversation veered off in a different direction (we were by then on the bus heading for Dili, our words being listened to by adjacent Indonesians), and I was left with a tantalising sense of unfinished business.

Would Timor forever remain a land of illusions, or might its people, one day, be able to abandon subterfuge and speak their minds? The dangers of such honesty for ordinary Timorese was forcibly brought home to me by a final incident on the journey back to Dili. The bus had stopped at Manatuto (birthplace of Xanana Gusmão and the current Governor, Abílio Soares) to allow the driver and passengers to eat some food at the Javanese-run roadside noodle restaurant. Inside was a very drunk Indonesian - a voluble North Sumatran Batak - whom rumour had it was an off duty policeman. As we queued up to buy our meal, he noticed my son and, in a hectoring tone, started to ask questions about me. 'Name? Business? Purpose of journey?' Although drunk, he spoke excellent English. Another coincidence? My son's replies were non-committal. Hoping to avoid a direct encounter, I sat down carefully with my back to

him and concentrated on my food. But the Batak interposed himself, swaying unsteadily on his feet right in front of me. 'Name? I asked you your name, right? Well what is it?' Silence. A full minute passed. 'My name is my own business' I eventually replied. 'Come on! Don't be like that!' The hectoring voice now had an edge to it. I detected a veiled - or not so veiled - threat - 'Don't monkey with me! I have friends in the police station just over the road, and if you can't keep a civil tongue in your head we can teach you some manners.' As a foreigner I could get away with it - just - but if I had been a Timorese it would have been a different story. I had never felt the the contrast between occupier and occupied more keenly: this could have been Ireland under the Black and Tans or Nazi-occupied France.

Conclusions

What then can one conclude from such a brief eight-day visit? Not much, although each day felt as though one had lived an eternity. The sheer impunity of the Indonesian military presence was a shock. Given the weight of international censure of Indonesia since Santa Cruz I was expecting Jakarta to have cleaned up its act. The occupation would be heavy, I thought, but at least now it would be tightly managed and

controlled. But, no, the military continued to call the shots. The exploitation of natural resources (coffee, timber and marble) was clearly proceeding apace, Timorese work gangs clear-felling the Walaikama forest (partly to prevent guerrilla attack) on the road to Baucau under the watchful eye of Indonesian soldiers, and Buginese transmigrants engrossing the import-export trade of Tibar (the main export port for Ermera's high quality coffee) on the north coast to the west of Dili. 'If the UN comes here we will shoot them!' was the response of one Indonesian officer to the idea that international intervention might be a way forward out of the current political impasse.

Unless effective pressure can be applied on Western Governments to stop arming Indonesia, the future of the East Timorese will be bleak indeed. Already, the numbers of Indonesian transmigrants (both official and unofficial) have begun to undermine the balance of Timorese society, bringing Muslims and Hindus from inner island Indonesia into a predominantly Catholic and animist community. Out of the 867,000 inhabitants in East Timor today, fully a quarter are thought to be newcomers.(24) Indeed, with unemployment rates running as high as 65 percent amongst East Timorese youth (compared to only 35 percent amongst transmigrants), frustrations are rising. But, however steep the

odds, East Timorese, both young and old, are still prepared to sacrifice themselves to achieve a free Timor, the goal that was so brutally denied them by the Suharto regime and its Western backers in the mid-1970s. We in the privileged West must ensure that such sacrifice is not in vain. As one guerrilla commander put it, 'let your government know you care. If there is international pressure, if the [ten] UN resolutions [on East Timor] are implemented, East Timor would be free. Falintil and the clandestine front within East Timor will continue to fight, but, without help from the outside, we can never hope to defeat Indonesia with its huge army.'(25)

[5000 words]

END NOTES

(1) The most careful analysis of demographic statistics in East Timor in the period 1975-81, when the heaviest population losses took place, can be found in Gabriel Defert, Timor Est. Le Génocide Oublié. Droit d'un Peuple et Raisons d'États (Paris: L'Éditions L'Harmattan, 1992), pp.147-51 and Fig.8, who cites a low of 170,000 (based on Indonesian statistics) and a high (based on Church statistics) of 308,000. The pre-invasion population of East Timor numbered around 696,000, see Defert, op.cit., p.148.

(2) The German-designed MP5 sub-machine guns, now being used by the Indonesian security forces, were supplied in 1995 by Heckler and Koch from their Nottingham (UK) factory. So popular is such British merchandise that the Asian Defence Journal has described Indonesia as 'Heckler & Koch' country, see 'Making a Killing', Amnesty No.84 (July/August 1997), pp.18-19.

(3) On these 'fence of legs' (pagar betis/Operasi Kikis) tactics used by the Indonesian army to flush out Fretilin guerrillas in the early 1980s, see Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, The War Against East Timor (London: Zed Books, 1984), pp.41-44, 230-31, 238-39; and, for a moving personal account of one of these operations which resulted in huge losses of civilian lives in the Aitana region in the eastern sector, see Cristiano Costa, 'Timorese Refugee on Indonesian Operations in East Timor since 1975', Tapol Bulletin No.87 (June 1988), p.10; and No.88 (August 1988), p.19.

(4) The three Sulawesi battalions were: 700, 713 and 721, the first two Kostrad battalions (on the Menado-based 713, which was for long commanded by the recently appointed Army Chief-of-Staff, General Wiranto, himself a Kopassus officer who served in East Timor for four years after the 1975 invasion, see Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 May 1997, p.50; and Ben Anderson, Audrey Kahin, et al, 'Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite: Selected Biographies', Indonesia No.59 (April 1995), pp.61-2). The other battalions, 459 and 501, were from the Central Java (Diponegoro) and East Java (Brawijaya) Divisions.

(5) For official Indonesian figures regarding troop levels in East Timor, see Claiborne Pell, Democracy: An Emerging Asian Value. A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 104th Congress, 2nd Session, June 1996 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1996), p.11 and Appendix entitled 'Military Situation', which lists 15,403 men, not including the substantial numbers of special forces/commandos under the direct command of Suharto's son-in-law, Major-General Prabowo Subianto Djojohadikusumo.

(6) On the Hansip/Ratih, and the locally recruited Timorese battalions (744 based in Dili; and 745 based in Baucau), which also contain many West Timorese (from Atambua) and other Indonesians, see Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, War Against East Timor, pp.39-40, 225-6. The Timorese battalions have often been used for special operations, for example, the action in late December 1978 led by Major [now Lieutenant-General] Yunus Yosfiah, then in command of Battalion 744, an Indonesian RPKAD (paratroop) officer, which led to the death of Fretilin's second president and commander-in-chief, Nicolau Lobato, at Turiscai in the Maubisse hills some 50 kms to the southeast of Dili), see Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, War Against East Timor, p.36; and Ben Anderson, Audrey Kahin et l, 'Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite', July 1 1989-January 1 1992', Indonesia No.53 (April 1992), p.125 n.73.

(7) See Constâncio Pinto, East Timor's Unfinished Struggle. Inside the Timorese Resistance. A Testimony (Boston: South End Press, 1996), p.100.

(8) CNRM/East Timor National Council of Maubere Resistance, 'East Timor Report', 9 August 1996, website cnrmnt.reg.easttimor at pactok.peg.apc.org.

(9) Ibid.; and, on José Catarino de Melo, see Pinto, Unfinished Struggle, p.181.

(10) See Carey, 'East Timor: Third World Colonialism and the Struggle for National Identity', Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism (RISCT), Conflict Studies Nos 293/4 (October-November 1996), p.24.

(11) On the arrests, which led to a strong protest by Bishop Belo to senior Indonesian officers in both Jakarta and Dili, see Commissão Justiça e Paz Diocese Dili, 'Penangkapan/Penahanan di Uatu Lari: Resume Daftar Nama-Nama Warga Masyarakyat yang Ditahan/Ditangkap oleh Aparat Keamanan sejak tgl. 6-2-97 hingga tgl. 10-2-97 [Arrests/Detention in Uatu Lari: Resumé

of the List of Names of Members of the Community who have been Arrested/Detained by the Security Forces from 6-2-97 to 10-2-97)' (which lists 59 arrests, of whom most were being held in the District Military Headquarters [Kodim]); and 'Timorenses Interrogados', A Capital (Lisbon), 16 February 1997 (which refers to 109 youth being interrogated in Viqueque on 7 February); and, on the shootings, see 'GPK Timtim Tembak Enam Orang Hingga Meninggal [Security Disrupter Gang (Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanan/GPK) in East Timor Shoots Six People to Death]', Kompas (Jakarta), 10 April 1997; and Commissão Justiça e Paz Diocese Dili, 'Informação', 7 April 1997.

(12) See Robert Cribb, Historical Dictionary of Indonesia (Metuchen, N.J. and London: Scarecrow Press, 1992), pp.285-6 (sub: 'Maréchaussée') and pp.375-6 (sub: 'police').

(13) This issue has recently been aired in the report by Ann Clwyd, 'British Aid to Indonesia: The Continuing Scandal' (September 1995), pp.20-28; and the official National Audit Office report, Aid to Indonesia (London: The Stationery Office, HC 101 Session 1996-97, 29 November 1996), pp.36-39.

(14) This was the term I heard a local Timorese use when I went to register with the police in Lospalos during an overnight stay in early April 1997. The fact that many of the police in East Timor hailed from Bali, Lombok and other eastern Indonesian islands (the captain of the Lospalos police was from Lombok), may be one reason why their status is diminished in the eyes of the mainly Javanese military. Some 70 percent of ABRI officers are now Javanese, compared with around 55 percent at the start of Suharto's 'New Order' regime in the mid-1960s.

(15) See Richard Lloyd Parry, 'Seventeen Killed as East Timor Rebels Step Up Attacks', The Independent, 2 June 1997; Tapol Bulletin, No.141 (July 1997), p.2. According to the latter source, 17 policemen (including some from Brimob) died when a grenade was thrown into the back of their truck; four others were shot while trying to escape.

(16) See the testimony of Michael Davis, a Modern History student from Newcastle-on-Tyne University in the UK, who went to East Timor in August 1996 to conduct research and was taken in for questioning by police intelligence officers in Baucau and Dili, the last of whom 'refused to believe me when I told him that I had not been beaten up by his counterparts in Baucau'. See Michael Davis, 'The Role of the Younger Generation in East Timorese Resistance to Indonesian Rule', unpublished

Single Honours BA History Thesis, Newcastle-upon-Tyne University (February 1997), pp.18-19.

(17) See James Dunn, Timor. A People Betrayed (Milton: The Jacaranda Press, 1983), p.309; and John Taylor, Indonesia's Secret War. The Hidden History of East Timor (London: Zed Books, 1991), p.136, referring to the individual ceasefires which preceded the general ceasefire (23 March-7 August 1983) negotiated by Colonel Purwanto and Xanana Gusmão. The bartering of high quality Timorese coffee for rice, sugar, imported medicines and other necessities, was common in the period before the capture of the main coffee producing areas around Ermera by the Indonesians in 1977-8.

(18) See Ben Anderson, Audrey Kahin et al.,'Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite, January 1, 1992-August 31, 1993', Indonesia, No.56 (October 1993), p.126; 'Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite, September 1, 1993-September 30, 1995', Indonesia No.60 (October 1995), p.106. On the rapid turnover of Korem commanders in Dili since the 12 November 1991 Santa Cruz Massacre, and the career difficulties faced by some of them, see below n.20.

(19) For an account of the incident at Bercoli (Berecoli) on 12-15 April 1989, when soldiers of Battalion 328 under Major-General (then Major) Prabowo's command reportedly shot dead 20 civilians, see Taylor, Forgotten War, p.103; and Tapol Bulletin No.93 (June 1989), p.2. Another incident involving the murder of a top Fretilin commander near Venilale - under cover of a peace negotiation in which Major-General (then Major) Prabowo had used the name of the revered Salesian priest, Fr. Locatelli, to secure the Fretilin commander's unarmed attendance - was related to me by a Church source during my visit to Venilale in April 1997.

(20) Following the dismissal of Brigadier-General Rudolf Samuel Warouw on 8 January 1992 in the aftermath of the Santa Cruz Massacre, the following officers have served as Korem (pre-1993, Kolakops [Komando Pelaksana Operasi/East Timor Operations Execution Command) commanders in East Timor: (1) Brigadier-General (now Major-General) Theo Syafei (8 January 1992 - 20 July 1993), a RPKAD (paratroop) officer, who later fell into political disgrace with the regime for backing the call for an election boycott (Golput) in May 1997; (2) Colonel (now Major-General) Johny Lumintang (20 July 1993 - c. 31 August 1994), an infantry officer who had previously commanded the Airborne Infantry Brigade of the Strategic Army Reserve (Kostrad), and is now head of the Trikora/Kodam VIII Command (Irian Barat and Maluku); (3) Colonel Kiki Syahnakri Y.K. (c. 31

August 1994 - 27 May 1995), whose career seems to have fallen apart after his departure from East Timor; (4) Colonel Mahidin Simbolon (27 May 1995 - late May 1997), previously Assistant for Intelligence to the Kopassus Commander, now attending a course at the National Defense Council (Lemhanas/Lembaga Hankam Nasional); and (5) Colonel Slamet Sidabutar (late May 1997 - present), previously commander of Group II of Kopassus based in Surakarta. The two last commanders have had especially close ties with Prabowo since they hail from his regiment.

(21) See Pinto, Unfinished Struggle, pp.148-57; and Nick Cater, 'Timorese Bear the Scars of Repression', The West Australian, 30 September 1995, pp.18-19, for eyewitness accounts by Timorese of their treatment at the hands of the SGI torturers/interrogators at Colmera.

(22) Clare Dixon, 'Cry of a Forgotten Land', The Tablet, 22 November 1991, quoted in Robert Archer, 'The Catholic Church in East Timor', in Peter Carey and G. Carter Bentley, East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging of a Nation (London: Cassell, 1995), p.131.

(23) According to local informants, the disturbances occurred after members of the local Muslim community (estimated at 7,000 in Oecussi, or around 20 percent of the population), had sent a boxed offering of food from the late February religious feast to the local priest. Such boxed food offerings are normal for those who are not able to attend such feasts in person. This time, however, the box was found to contain not food, but the gnawed chicken bones and other left-overs from the meal. When the priest opened the box, his Timorese catechist saw what was inside and immediately went to tell the local Catholic inhabitants, a riot then ensuing, which eventually spilled over into West Timor proper (hence the burning of the market place in Kafamenanu in March just before my visit). Many arrests were made, and scores of young people from Oecussi fled over the border to East Timor to go into hiding in Dili and other places. On my return to Kupang on 8 April by the Sempati flight to Surabaya, I witnessed a manacled prisoner being escorted off the plane by a police officer.

(24) Figures supplied to me by Universitas Timor Timur sources during my visit to East Timor in April 1997. Compare this with the 1995 figure given in Carey and Carter Bentley, East Timor at the Crossroads, p.13, which estimates the 'newcomer' population at 150,000, or 20 percent of the total inhabitants of the province. In 1996, in the 15-60 age group, 299,177 Timorese are unemployed, as compared to 161,095 non-Timorese. In terms of the private sector, which is dominated by Indonesian/Javanese

capital, 95 percent of all those in employment are non-Timorese compared to 5 percent who are Timorese. In the public sector, of those with a university degree, 90 percent of those employed are non-Timorese, 10 percent Timorese: of those with a high school (Sekolah Menengah Atas/SMA) diploma, 40 percent of those employed are non-Timorese, 60 percent Timorese.

(25) See Timor Link (Catholic Institute for International Relations/CIIR), No.39 (April 1997), p.8, quoting Rebecca Winters and Brian Kelly, Children of the Resistance. The Current Situation in East Timor As Seen Through the Eyes of Two Australian Tourists (Darwin: Australians for a Free East Timor [AFFET], 1996).